

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2005/04/27 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000800060018-8

18 January 1963

ANNEX TO: Revision of Current Intelligence Daily
Reporting Structure

SUBJECT : Documentation of Difficulties with DIA

1. Dissemination of the DIA Summary

a. We have no comprehensive information on hard-copy dissemination of the DIA Summary. CIA alone receives 82 copies. Copies are also included in note-books delivered each morning to Mr. McNamara, General Taylor, General Clifton and probably others.

b. Our latest complete record of wire dissemination (attached) is several months old. At that time, DIA listed 95 primary addressees, to 37 of which DIA also sent the Central Intelligence Bulletin. (This last figure has by now risen to 40). We have no information on retransmittal of either publication by primary addressees to their subcommands, but believe there is further proliferation.

2. Duplication between the DIA Summary and the Central Intelligence Bulletin.

a. There is a substantial duplication in coverage between the two publications. For instance, in the five Summaries published in the period 14-18 January, there was a total of 47 items. Of these, 23 duplicated coverage in the Bulletin, and 5 others did so partially. There were, however, differences in language, interpretation, and selection of detail. Almost all the remainder were "nuts-and-bolts" items we would not judge worthy of inclusion in the Bulletin.

b. The relationship of many duplicating items published by DIA to departmental military intelligence is somewhat tenuous. For instance:

-i-

NSA and DIA review(s) completed.

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/04/27 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000800060018-8

NGA Review Completed.

Annex to

Copy 1

25X6

iii. 18 Jan. Subversion in Venezuela.

25X6

v. 16 Jan. Political maneuvering in Togo.

vi. 16 Jan. Political wrangling in South Korea.

c. Captain Whatton of DIA's Current Intelligence Division, has informed us that it is DIA's policy to publish, on the same day, a companion piece to any we publish in the Bulletin on purely military subjects. They also duplicate our coverage in practice on all priority subjects such as Cuba and the Congo, the only differences being in the amount of detail on military subjects.

3. Use of sensitive information in the DIA Summary

a. The Summary regularly uses information from sensitive State and DD/P cables (after clearance has been granted).

b. When OCI uses, or proposes to use such information, DIA feels it has a right to use it too and requests clearance from the producer. Neither State nor DD/P believe they can deny DIA the right to publish anything they allow us to publish.

c. The Chief of the State Operations Center has informed us of his concern over this situation; we are worried that the Department might believe it necessary to deny us information rather than allow DIA to have it. On one occasion, we found it

-ii-

25X1

necessary to withdraw an item from the Bulletin because DD/P was unwilling to release the report for DIA's use.

d. The Summary also includes articles containing sensitive information on Soviet weapons development and deployment, derived largely from [redacted] sanitized photography. (See for instance the attached piece on ICBM deployment).

25X1

-iii-

~~SECRET~~

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/04/27 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000800060018-8

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2005/04/27 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000800060018-8

Pro-Communist Brazilian Officers Being Assigned Key Posts

The new Chief of President Goulart's Military Household, Gen Alvino Silva, is reportedly a pro-Communist who will support the President's assignment of leftists or pro-Communists to key military positions. His predecessor, Gen Kruehl -- now Minister of War -- backed Goulart in naming his adherents to key positions but evidently balked at Communist sympathizers. Goulart is continuing to seek support from key army generals for his policy of "intranquillity and agitation", according to the Army Attache.

Comment: Although Goulart is gradually getting his followers, many of them pro-Communists, into key positions, he is proceeding in such a way that he offers no issue which would unite the Armed Forces in opposition to him. If he continues this course, the top military command will consist almost entirely of his supporters -- who are at the least soft on Communism -- and the Armed Forces will be in no position to resist a turn to the left in Brazil.

(CONFIDENTIAL)

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/04/27 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000800060018-8

Next 6 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2005/04/27 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000800060018-8